In this paper, we explore the concept of bearing witness in nursing practice. We examine the description of bearing witness in the nursing literature, particularly that offered by William Cody who suggests that bearing witness results in the limited moral obligation of "true presence." We then turn to Lorraine Code's work on testimony, drawing parallels between the concepts of testimony and bearing witness.
| INTRODUC TI ON
Bearing witness has been described in the nursing literature as a method of caring and a way to validate another's experience (Cody, 2007) . Nurses frequently work with vulnerable and marginalized populations and are present with people facing major changes in their lives. The act of bearing witness is said to help authenticate these experiences and to help people find meaning in their suffering (Cody, 2001b) . Nurse scholars have tended to focus on the moral obligation that comes with bearing witness, with an emphasis on the individual choice that nurses must make either to bear witness or to not bear witness in the context of a humanistic nurse-patient encounter (Cody, 2001b (Cody, , 2007 . The notion of testimony described outside of the nursing literature is similar to the concept of bearing witness in several important ways. Receiving testimony is the act of listening to and validating another's story, but here is often discussed in relation to injustice, including the possibility of epistemic injustice. The presence of inequitable relations of power and privilege in society is understood to impact the ability to authentically or fairly receive testimony and thus may contribute to important issues of testimonial injustice (Code, 2010; Fricker, 2007) . Analyses that attend to relations of power, privilege and the possibility of testimonial injustice reframe receiving testimony and bearing witness as social practices, entailing responsibilities to examine one's own "sense-making" practices as well as political obligations to respond and to take action (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 Rogers, 2014;  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) 2015a, 2015b). Individual nurses may "bear witness" to the suffering of their patients and indeed, often witness the injustice that creates this suffering. However, a persistent understanding of bearing witness as an individual moral obligation seems limited in its ability to help nurses think through such witnessing and testimony as a social and political practice, a conception well established in other academic fields.
In this paper, we compare and contrast these differing meanings of bearing witness, as well as their implications for nursing practice. We first discuss the work of William Cody, 1 a nurse theorist from the United States, who draws on Rosemarie Parse's theory of Humanbecoming and presents the idea of bearing witness in nursing practice as a moral obligation of the humanistic nurse, a figure who appears in these writings as a seemingly autonomous, a social subject. We then turn to Lorraine Code, a Canadian feminist political philosopher and social epistemologist, who utilizes the work of Michel Foucault to inform her work on testimony. We use Code's and other social epistemologists' ideas to frame bearing witness and testimony as a politicized practice. We then look to the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), specifically the inclusion of honorary witnesses in a nationwide process of trying to understand and address the historical injustices done to Indigenous peoples in Canada, as an instructive enactment of the ethico-political meanings of bearing witness. In particular, we highlight Canadian broadcaster Shelagh Rogers' experience as an honorary witness and her conclusion from this experience that witnessing entails a responsibility to respond in the face of injustice. We ultimately argue that bearing witness as a nurse entails both moral and political obligations, and that this has important implications for nursing practice.
| B E ARING WITNE SS A S A MOR AL OBLIG ATION
The three main sources discussed in this paper describe the notion of bearing witness in different but overlapping ways. In nursing literature, bearing witness is described as an individualized moral obligation, mainly by William Cody (2001a Cody ( , 2001b Cody ( , 2007 ) following Parse's theory of Humanbecoming. The central idea is that bearing witness involves attesting to the authenticity of another's experience by being present and by listening to their story (Cody, 2001b It also seems the case that though beginning with concern about a complex social problem, such an exposition tends to take social issues revealed in a process of bearing witness into the realm of existential psychology where social action and understanding retains its individual and individualizing character. Thus despite a shift in the site of analysis to the community setting, the view of bearing witness as a moral obligation of an individual nurse in the context of an individual nurse-patient encounter is sustained. What seems to be missing here is any analysis of the social-political dimensions of both nurse and patient/community and thus of the practice of bearing witness itself.
More recently, Humanbecoming scholars have identified the possibility that bearing witness actually does entail a call to action, albeit that "action may simply be standing with or naming what is happening, or it may be more -much more" (Bunkers, 2014, p. 194) .
Here again, it appears that the choice to bear witness is sufficient to fulfil a nurse's moral obligation, and that although this choice may function as a call to action, further response is not a necessary element of the practice of bearing witness. Indeed, the proponents of the Humanbecoming school of thought have been criticized for both their lack of explicit attention to social justice issues and their principled view of nurses as non-interventionist (Thorne et al., 1998; Thorne, Henderson, McPherson, & Pesut, 2004) . Contra
Humanbecoming scholars, Thorne et al. (1998) argue that nursing is a socially and politically engaged profession, and that it has a mandate beyond simply offering true presence. Nurses do not work in isolation, and must be able to take into consideration, and do some good in relation to the social and political forces influencing nursing practices (Thorne et al., 2004) .
| B E ARING WITNE SS A S AN E THI CO -P OLITI C AL PR AC TI CE
What kind of thinking is necessary to understand bearing witness as Outside of nursing, more critical discussions of witnessing and testimony have gained prominence in certain philosophical circles since the end of the 20th century (Kidd, Medina, & Pohlhaus, 2017; Kramer & Weigel, 2017) including feminist scholarship (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 . Often, the Holocaust survivor testimony serves as a paradigm case in these discussions, used to emphasize the two-sided nature of testimony-its epistemic and ethical aspects (Code, 2010; Schmidt, 2011 Schmidt, , 2017 . Briefly, in contrast to traditional epistemology (e.g., Plato), which rejected testimony as an unreliable source of knowledge, contemporary social epistemology recognizes testimony as an important epistemic source. For example, Schmidt (2011) describes knowledge acquisition in everyday life as a form of testimony, such as when children learn by listening to their parents and teachers.
Similarly, social epistemologists recognize the inescapably social and situated nature of knowledge acquisition in their analyses of roles that structured differences such as gender, race and class play in the production and circulation of knowledge (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 . Thus, recognizing the sociality of testimony as an epistemic practice brings to the forefront its ethical and political aspects. In other words, epistemic encounters entail judgements-made by both those who speak and those who listen-about trust (worthiness), credibility, social authority and truthfulness (Schmidt, 2011) . Other authors also draw attention to the politicized nature of witnessing/testimony, distinguishing the practices of everyday testimony, a primary source of empirical knowledge, from "testimonies that bear witness to the inhuman, the atrocious, and the elusive" (Givoni, 2011, p. 149) .
Importantly, all of these perspectives underline epistemic issues that arise from the positioning of subjects in a social space.
To develop these ideas here, we mainly draw on the writings of Canadian feminist social epistemologist Lorraine Code. As described by Code (2010 Code ( , 2014 , receiving testimony, like bearing witness, requires listening to another's story and attesting to the authenticity of another's experience. Testimony is an interactive practice that requires the receiver to make an effort to understand what is being shared with them. The key point is that in order to authentically receive testimony, one must not only acknowledge the structuring effects of power and privilege in society, but also must be aware of the potential for prejudice that can prevent the receiver from understanding the testimony shared with them (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 (Code, 2014, p. 152) .
Similar to Haraway's (1988) concern with claims-making as a powersensitive conversation, Code highlights the non-transparency of receiving testimony and locates the ethics of this practice not in simple reception but in critical interrogation of meaning.
Approaching testimony as a power-sensitive conversation, Code (2010 Code ( , 2014 emphasizes the structuring effects of power and privilege in society, and the influence of these in how testimony is able to be received and understood. She also stresses the responsibility for action that results from receiving another's testimony (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 ). As noted above, Code (2014) describes testimony as an interactive process-the sharing of knowledge and experiences between people. At a glance, this is similar to Cody's (2001a Cody's ( , 2001b Cody's ( , 2007 idea of bearing witness to another's experience, which involves listening to and validating another's story. However, Code (2014) argues that in order for testimony to be fully understood, the person receiving the testimony must be authentic and able to understand what is being shared with them. Importantly, the ability to understand another's experience depends on the listener's awareness of a possibility of prejudice against the speaker. Prejudice is inevitable, flowing from situatedness in a social world and the structured and structuring effects of difference. Here however, the danger is not so much the failure to understand the other, but the failure to recognize that any understanding is an accomplishment and will be necessarily partial. Or as Haraway (1988) suggests, we start from recognizing that we have a point of view and then cultivate a desire to learn how to see from the perspective of others.
For Code, to authentically receive testimony in a context shaped by prejudice, one must critically and continually examine one's own understanding. Notably, Code's idea of authenticity differs from that of Cody (2007) . Whereas Code might agree with Cody's suggestion that authenticity requires the offering of true presence, she would insist that an authentic response also requires taking action to critically examine the influence of power and privilege on ourselves and others. To explain the importance of authentically receiving testimony and the critical reflection it requires, Code draws on the concept of testimonial injustice initially developed by Miranda Fricker, a British-American feminist philosopher and epistemologist.
Fricker (2007) explains that testimonial injustice occurs when testimony is not considered credible due to prejudice that prevents the testifier from being heard and understood. Both Code (2014) and Fricker (2007) emphasize that in order to authentically receive testimony, we must not only be open to it but must also be aware of how our own prejudice might influence us. Discussing privilege, In addition to demanding attention to the effects of relations of power and privilege in shaping understanding, the process of receiving and understanding testimony calls forth a responsibility to take action (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 that extends beyond individual self-reflection. For Code (2010) , this is realized through what she calls "advocacy practices" (p. 21). This advocacy can take the form of representing and supporting marginalized groups, as well as taking action to correct injustice. Code (2010) recognizes that advocacy can be difficult, especially if it goes against the dominant interests in society; however, she maintains that it is a crucial part of receiving testimony. Thus, the receiving of testimony is an active, rather than a passive process. For Code (2010) , awareness that social inequalities complicate the practice of testimony, and may lead to testimonial injustice, does not release us from a responsibility to act against the perpetuation of social injustice (see also Code, 2014) . Recognizing the existence of injustice is, in fact, part of what is required to respond authentically to another's testimony.
If we authentically receive another's testimony, have borne witness to their experience, and recognize that they are suffering from
an injustice, what is our responsibility? Code (2010 Code ( , 2014 suggests that it is our responsibility to take action to correct this injustice.
This responsibility is political in nature and requires a willingness to advocate on behalf of those who are affected by the injustice. From this perspective, a responsibility to bear witness in nursing practice is more than just an individual moral obligation; it includes a responsibility to society as well. 
| RE S P OND ING TO TE S TIMONY: THE TRUTH AND RECON CILIATI ON COMMISS ION OF C ANADA

| B E YOND " TRUE PRE S EN CE": IMPLI C ATI ON S FOR N UR S E S' PR AC TI CE S
Are we asking too much of nurses? Certainly some (e.g., Lipscomb, Being open to and hearing our patients starts with being present.
We agree with Cody (2001a Cody ( , 2001b Cody ( , 2007 that nurses have a moral responsibility to be present, to bear witness to the experiences of our patients and to help them through the difficult experiences they are facing. Differently than Cody however, we argue that as nursing is a socially embedded practice, so is the practice of bearing witness. Using the work of Code (2010 Code ( , 2014 , we argue that it is also nurses' responsibility to be aware of the effects of social positioning, our own situatedness in relations of power and privilege, and importantly, how these will influence our ability to hear what patients have to say to us. According to Code (2010) , marginalized societal groups may be unable to communicate effectively across differences, and their testimony may not be heard or understood by those with more power in society. In the same way, Code (2014) also recognizes the difficulty in being able to discern how one's ability to hear and understand is shaped through social relations of power and privilege.
She acknowledges that authentically receiving testimony, when we are positioned to do so, raises complex ethical issues, including the possibility of complicity in injustice.
To be complicit is defined as "helping to… do wrong in some way" (Merriam-Webster, 2018) . Whitt (2015) uses the phrase complicit injustice to refer to the ways that both ignorance and a passive attitude can perpetuate injustice in society. He describes ignorance as implicated in the maintenance of power and privilege in society-a dangerous state of affairs that needs to be challenged by greater knowledge of injustices. Similarly, Code (2010) writes that "ignorance maintained and sustained is a powerful force of resistance to testimonial knowledge 'going through'" (p. 27) and strongly argues that ignorance can be damaging to society. Many nurse educators in Canada consider social justice an important concept in nursing curricula and advocate for its explicit and meaningful inclusion (Rozenda, Santos Salas, & Cameron, 2017) . In order to begin to address social justice issues in nursing, we must first begin with knowledge. As identified by Whitt (2015) , one strategy to prevent injustice is to address the issue of ignorance. This is echoed by the TRC (2015a) and its calls to action, which specifically include the need for education on the injustices done to Canada's Indigenous peoples to be included in curricula. This call to action is beginning to be realized at the University of Alberta, where discussion about the recommendations of the TRC is to be included at all levels of nursing education.
What would the active, politically charged approach to bearing witness, outlined by Code and Rogers, look like in nursing practice? Nurses are meant to advocate for their patients. We are tempted to say that this could be as simple as ensuring that patients from marginalized populations receive the same quality of care as other patients. However, the word simple is utterly inappropriate. Considering the realities of contemporary nursing practice, nurses' decisions for resource allocation as well as timeliness and extent of services are often driven by organizational priorities for efficiency, whereby justice-based advocacy may be backgrounded (Allen, 2014) . In addition, when allocating scarce resources-such as acute care beds-nurses find themselves operating within the discourse of "undeserving patients." This discourse suggests that these patients-often from marginalized groups-have inflicted their problems upon themselves, and thus, they are not as deserving as others (Allen, 2014; Hillman, 2013) . These examples suggest that the responsibility nurses have to advocate for marginalized patients, arising from bearing witness to their stories and experiences, is not simple.
Nurses can share the experiences and the stories of injustice that they have borne witness to with individuals and organizations involved in shaping public policy. Perhaps the most effective mechanism is actually getting involved in the creation of policies affecting health and thus helping to tackle injustice on a bigger scale. This responsibility for advocacy can be difficult to realize, but nurses are well positioned to work with marginalized groups in society and provide some of the support and resources that they need. It can be difficult to meaningfully advocate for social justice, especially in health care, where fiscal restraint is always a priority. However, the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) specifically outlines the ethical responsibility that nurses have to advocate for social justice issues and emphasizes the importance of promoting justice in nursing practice (CNA, 2017).
Nurses who desire to foreground issues of social justice in their practices may find these alternative conceptualizations of bearing witness, informed by the ethical-politics of testimony, useful as they strive to shape their practices in more active and engaged ways, and particularly to challenge the conditions that hold us in place as passive witnesses. By striving to authentically bear witness and accepting the resulting responsibility to take action, we can fulfil both the moral and the political obligations that we have suggested are central to the concept of bearing witness in nursing practice.
| CON CLUS ION
The concept of bearing witness has been discussed as it appears both inside and outside of the discipline of nursing alongside the practice of testimony. In nursing, Cody (2001a Cody ( , 2001b Cody ( , 2007 suggests that bearing witness is a moral obligation for nurses assumed to be autonomous, choosing subjects. This obligation is fulfilled by being with communicating humanely and offering true presence to patients. This is said to authenticate the experience of the patient and to help them find meaning in their suffering. In contrast, Code But an ethico-political understanding requires more than the examination of one's personal position in society. Patterned inequalities means authentically receiving testimony often results in witnessing injustice, which in turn calls forth a response and a political obligation to take action (Code, 2010 (Code, , 2014 . Shelagh Rogers' (2014) experience as an honorary witness for the TRC illustrates the political possibilities for action on receiving testimony. Bearing witness, both as a moral and as a political obligation, has several implications for nursing practice. These implications can be summarized, in Rogers' words, as "a collective responsibility to make things better. To act.
Because if we do nothing, nothing will change" (p. 3).
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